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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Policy Research Working Paper 5454
This paper takes stock of the growing success of 
preferential trade agreements. It revisits what are the 
defining characteristics of modern preferential trade 
agreements, which are typically pursued for a diverse 
array of motives. In particular, the market access 
justification traditionally used to analyze the desirability 
and impact of preferential trade agreements misses 
increasingly important dimensions. The “Beyond 
Market Access” agenda of preferential trade agreements 
This paper—a joint product of the Growth and Competitiveness Unit, World Bank Institute; and the Trade Department, 
Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network—is part of a larger effort in the World Bank to assess the development 
implications of regional trade and integration agreements. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web 
at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at Jchauffour@worldbank.org and Jmaur@worldbank.org.
presents a new and broad set of deep regulatory and 
policy issues that differs in substance from the removal 
of tariff and quantitative barriers to trade. Issues related 
to preferences and discrimination, as well as the nature 
and implementation of commitments acquire a different 
meaning in deep preferential trade agreements. This 
change of paradigm presents significant opportunities and 
challenges for reform-minded developing countries to use 
preferential trade agreements to their own advantage. 
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1  A Preference for Deep Integration  
Economists have repeatedly warned against them, NGOs have fought them, and some 
governments have grudgingly (at least in appearance) signed them. Yet, in the past 20 years 
growth in the number of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) has been unabated. Even more 
strikingly, their scope has broadened. Deep integration provisions in PTAs have now become 
ubiquitous. 
While multilateral liberalization is ultimately the most economically efficient way to guarantee 
market access and global participation in international trade, gaining preferential market access 
or preserving existing preferences has remained an important individual motivation for 
negotiating or acceding to PTAs. However, with the liberalization of trade around the world and 
the related diminishing size of preferential rents, the growing success of PTAs cannot be only 
explained by traditional market access motives (even factoring in the possible substitution of 
tariffs for other less transparent forms of protection). Countries are also interested in a host of 
other objectives, including importing higher policy standards, strengthening regional policy 
coordination, locking-in domestic reforms, and even addressing foreign policy issues (Schiff and 
Winters, 2004; Hoekman, 2010). 
This translates in a beyond-market-access ambition of many PTAs. Increasingly the focus 
includes agreement on a broad set of rules and discipline governing areas such as investment 
regimes, technical and sanitary standards, trade facilitation, competition policy, government 
procurement, intellectual property, environment protection, migration, labor rights, human rights, 
and other so-called “behind the border” issues.  
Ambition in recent PTAs expresses itself in two ways: the first one pursues what can be termed a 
WTO-plus agenda in policy areas that are covered by WTO disciplines, but often expanding on 
them in depth and breadth, and seeking greater enforceability. The second way is through rules 
and disciplines spanning policies that are not covered by the WTO, or covered very imperfectly 
(dubbed WTO-extra). In practice PTAs often pursue both objectives but with varying degrees. 
North American PTAs for instance focus more on WTO-plus disciplines, adding a few WTO-
extra to the mix. In contrast, European PTAs include numerous WTO extra aspects in its 3 
 
agreements. Horn et al. (2009) identify no less than 38 areas in U.S. and EU PTAs that aim to go 
beyond WTO disciplines. 
The proliferation and deepening of PTAs is creating vast opportunities to developing countries to 
modernize and upgrade their rules and disciplines for greater economic efficiency. It is also 
posing a serious challenge for policy makers, especially in low-income countries, as they must 
cover an increasingly large and complex set of issues with limited administrative resources – 
both for negotiation and implementation – and frequently no pre-existing practice.
2 
Indeed, PTAs increasingly address policy areas that are entirely new to developing countries. 
They may also deeply alter their development processes. To take an oft quoted example, it is 
possible that the inclusion of the most advanced forms of intellectual property rights protection 
may require an alternative economic development model, whereby acquisition of knowledge and 
know-how is no longer done through imitation and reverse engineering (such as the generic 
pharmaceutical industries in middle income countries), but through an as yet unproven process of 
capital and knowledge accumulation.  
The burden of meeting deep integration commitments in new PTAs is in sharp contrast to older 
trade agreements, which were chiefly about dismantling barriers to trade and making trade policy 
simpler to administer. While multilateral trade agreements under the WTO have also pursued a 
similar path toward greater complexity (for instance with the agreement on TRIPS in 1995), 
nowhere is the policy ambition as big as in PTAs with the spreading of regulatory disciplines to 
non-trade areas.  
Before looking at the issues in detail, it is useful to try to capture the essence of the difference in 
nature of the liberalization challenge posed by the new disciplines in PTAs. The trade literature 
usually characterizes this process in terms of positive vs. negative integration and behind the 
border vs. at the border integration.  
1.1  Positive integration or the need for public intervention 
The first Nobel prize winner in economics, Jan Tinbergen (1954) proposed the notions of 
positive and negative integration to characterize the process of international economic 
integration. Negative integration refers to the removal of trade barriers and the principle of non-
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discrimination. This is the traditional remit of trade negotiations.
3 As to positive integration, 
Tinbergen (1954: 79) defines it as follows: 
[the] creation of new institutions and their instruments or the modification of existing 
instruments. […] More generally, positive integration should consist of the creation 
of all institutions required by the welfare optimum which have to be handled in a 
centralized way. 
Analysts have often retained the first part of the definition, namely that integration is not just 
about removal of barriers to trade flows, but about “rule-making” to facilitate these flows. 
Interestingly though, Tinbergen offers in the second part of the definition a vision that suggests 
that the creation of intergovernmental public goods is also an element of the welfare-enhancing 
process of integration. This is an important aspect on which we will come back later. Taken as 
whole, we retain from Tinbergen’s definition the basic intuition that positive integration calls for 
public intervention to tackle market failures that would otherwise prevent economically optimal 
levels of integration.  
Various interpretations of the Tinbergen characterization have survived in the literature (see e.g. 
Pelkmans, 1986; Torrent, 2007; Ortino, 2004: 18-34; Hoekman and Kostecki, 2009).  Positive 
and negative integration imply substantive differences in the process of integration: negative 
integration would be mainly about the prohibition of a narrow set of policies, joint surveillance 
and eventually mechanisms of redress, while positive integration requires taking active steps 
towards integration by defining common policies and setting up the legal and administrative 
framework to implement them. This difference is, however, not as clear-cut as it appears at first 
(see for instance Torrent, 2007 and Ortino, 2004). In both cases of integration a certain degree of 
legal alignment is required as is the setting up of a minimum of common institutions. For 
instance agreeing on new rules that limit the way governments can intervene in markets could be 
seen alternatively as an instance of positive or negative integration.
4  
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Nevertheless the distinction remains useful to broadly think about important characteristics of 
deep integration as new dimensions of PTAs imply clearly more “retooling” of legal frameworks 
at the domestic level. Positive integration can be conducted in various ways depending how it is 
legally instrumentalized. Torrent (2007) notes for instance the substantive differences between 
US and EU agreements regarding procurement provisions. The US approach is more normative 
by inserting the rules in the agreement, whereas the EU adopts a more progressive approach by 
defining the rules through specialized organizations (such as expert committees). Relative to 
negative integration, positive integration entails substantial differences with respect to drafting 
language in agreements – the instruments of implementation being more complex – and therefore 
negotiations, as well as probably predictability with regard to implementation. For instance, 
when tackling trade facilitation issues, it is not sufficient to agree on rules that should be 
prevented (e.g. the use of consular fees), or on simple positive obligations such as transparency 
but countries must also agree on standards of procedures (such as for instance using risk 
management screening at borders) and monitor agency conduct. These obligations cannot be 
easily – and should not, according to some (Messerlin and Zarrouk, 2000) – incorporated into 
normative commitments in trade agreements. Beyond adopting new policies to open markets, 
positive integration is also about coordination of policies with trading partners, which may imply 
some form of institutional arrangements. 
1.2  Behind the border policies 
Another important dimension is characterized in the literature as behind the border vs. at the 
border measures. National Treatment and uniformization of obligations indeed differ in 
substance from MFN obligations in that they require that countries change policies that also 
affect internal transactions that are not necessarily trade related. 
The question of the impact on trade of domestic regulations is not new and is for instance well 
recognized in the WTO: Article III of the GATT requires that internal regulations comply with 
the National Treatment principle. Domestic policies have the potential to be designed to 
discriminate against foreign producers. Beyond addressing discrimination per se – the National 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Tinbergen’s terms, would be a clear example of “positive integration” (and they would be defended in this way by 
many in the European Commission). In political terms, NAFTA’s Chapter XI on investments would be looked at by 
many around the world as a typical example of “negative integration” that sharply reduces the capacity of 
Governments to intervene in the economy. It is also an example of “positive integration” that creates  common rules 
that go beyond the liberalization of access (for example on protection of investments). 6 
 
Treatment principle –, governments should also pursue the objective of reducing the costs of 
having to comply with multiple and heterogeneous requirements. As the world economy 
becomes more integrated and supply chains incorporate sourcing from many countries, the calls 
for some uniformization are growing. This is an area where PTAs play an increasing role.  
With behind the border policies, domestic transactions are directly affected; this has obvious 
direct welfare implications that differ from the indirect effect through trade goods prices and 
volumes. This also means a different political economy equilibrium. 
In this paper, we expand the notion of behind the border measures to include those measures that 
are included in trade agreements not because of their direct or indirect effects on trade, but 
merely because trade agreements provide a convenient vehicle of international negotiation or 
enforcement.  
In sum, deep integration measures may concern domestic areas of policies, not necessarily 
directly trade related. They require more advanced reform of the legal environment and generally 
a more complex set of instruments for implementation. They also may involve active supra-
national coordination. It is not hard to imagine then how more demanding and complex 
liberalization of these measures might be. The rest of this overview chapter elaborates on the 
theoretical and practical motivations behind today’s deep PTAs (Section 2) and then highlights key 
areas of consideration for policy makers as they contemplate their future PTA strategy (Section 3). 
2  The motivations for deep integration 
The reality of the new PTA landscape raises questions about the motives for entering into 
regional agreements. Why would policy makers around the world invest time, political capital, 
and resources in negotiating trade arrangements that discriminate among trading partners with 
uncertain welfare benefits? The answer can only be that policymakers in those negotiations and 
agreements are looking for benefits beyond market access for goods and services.  
This was foreseen by Krugman (1993) who assumed that one cause of the success of PTAs was 
the convenience of dealing with the variety, complexity and opacity of modern trade barriers in a 
bilateral/regional setting rather than at the multilateral GATT/WTO level. Implied behind 
Krugman’s statement was that the removal of traditional trade barriers was not necessarily 
solving the issue of market access.  7 
 
Beyond the traditional theoretical explanations of economic models, other explanations, either 
non-standard or not well explained by the economic science, have been reviewed by Schiff and 
Winters (2004) who  surveyed alternative rationales spanning from domestic policy anchoring, 
importing good regulatory practices,  supra-national coordination to achieve regional policy 
goals, hegemons exporting regulatory standards, to foreign policy consideration. The rest of this 
section reviews in more detail the economic societal and political economy motives to conclude 
a PTA. 
2.1  Economic motives  
2.1.1  Market access: A lesser driving force? 
Market access mercantilism is the traditional force behind the push for trade liberalization. Led 
by the false logic that import barriers should be lowered only if reciprocal access abroad for 
exports is granted, countries mutually agree to liberalize their market resulting in most cases in 
welfare enhancing liberalization. In a globalized world, countries seek to gain competitive 
advantage over their neighbors by negotiating special – preferential – market access with key 
destination markets. 
 











Several facts however challenge the traditional explanation. Preferences to start with, may not be as 
important as they were in the past. Tariffs have been falling worldwide (figure 1) and in a very 
general sense the most protected markets would now tend to exhibit tariff levels that are moderate in 
regard to 15 years ago.
5 Furthermore, advanced and middle income countries exhibit on average 
lower levels of protection than low-income countries. 
Moreover, with PTAs growing in number so do the recipients of preferences, leading to the 
erosion of the preference margins held over competitors. Carrère et al. (2010) answer the 
question of what is the real preference received by countries by computing an adjusted market 
access measure of what EU preference receiving partners actually enjoy (when one takes into 
account the preferences given to other partners). This measure is compared to the unadjusted 
measure of preference over MFN tariff and show that the real market access is often much lower, 
less than half in the case of Cambodia (an EBA recipient), and in some instance with no effective 
market access preference at all as is the case for a GSP recipient like Indonesia.  
Having just noted that that there is a tendency of diminishing MFN tariffs, that preferences 
margin are actually smaller than they appear, and finally that some developing countries already 
enjoy virtually tariff free access to major markets under GSP, EBA and other preferential 
regimes, can market access incentives alone explain reciprocal liberalization in the PTA context? 
In particular, as noted by Levy (2009), the reciprocal incentive seems to fail to explain the 
rationale behind asymmetric North-South type of agreements. Many developing countries 
already benefit from very good market access in their Northern partners, and therefore market 
access alone cannot justify North-South PTAs. Thus, at least in some cases, the rationale for 
PTAs goes beyond traditional market access. 
Market access may remain a motive in North-North and South-South agreements. In the latter 
case in particular, tariffs remain fairly substantial. Other incentives may also be at play: countries 
at the periphery of a network of agreements (such as for instance the partners of the EU and the 
US) may suffer from delocalization of industries to the hub of the network and away from them 
(the spokes) and also erosion of their preferential access since being in the hub provides 
preferential access to many more markets. This reality is what has driven countries like Chile, 
Singapore and Mexico to pursue “spoke-spoke” strategies by mirroring their large trading 
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partners PTA strategies in pursuing agreements with the same partners (even though their trade 
with such distant partners might be small). One could consider the strategy of EFTA in parallel 
to the EU and new countries joining the EU as being driven by a similar motive as well.
6 
Bhagwati (2008) also argues that even modest margins of preference have a sizeable impact in a 
globalized world where overall transaction costs are decreasing and where sources of 
comparative advantage can be found in small cost differences (“thin” margins of comparative 
advantage). Thus even small preferences on paper may become attractive for prospective 
partners. 
2.1.2  Other dimensions of market access 
Market access conditions are not only determined by tariffs. First, a range of other domestic 
policies, such as standards, and customs procedures may affect foreign exporters’ access costs to 
the market. As noted by Bagwell and Staiger (2001) when governments choose these policies 
unilaterally, there is a possibility that market access might be set at a lower and non-optimal 
level than it would be under reciprocal liberalization negotiations. 
Second, the market access question is not limited to goods only. Foreign investment decisions 
are another way to gain access in foreign markets, and therefore the inclusion of disciplines 
relating to investment in agreements can be an additional motive for reciprocal liberalization 
commitments.
7 Many PTAs now include investment disciplines that go beyond the WTO: WTO 
rules are limited to the supply of services following an investment (“commercial presence”) in 
the GATS and to trade-related investment measures (i.e., the TRIMs agreement). Moreover, 
GATS relies on an “enterprise-based” definition of investment, while bilateral rules generally 
refer to a broader “asset-based” definition that covers portfolio investment and different forms of 
tangible and intangible property (Miroudot, 2010).  
Third, because the traditional PTA analysis focuses on trade in goods, services trade is often 
omitted from the discussion. Yet, at a time when the services sector represents the largest and 
growing share of GDP in many developed and developing countries, when many services (e.g., 
electricity, telecom, transport) are key inputs into the production of goods and other services, and 
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Levy, 2009). 10 
 
when the IT revolution has increased their tradability,
8 the scope for gains from services 
liberalization might be considerable both in terms of increased trade flows and reduce cost inputs 
for firms. For some country groupings, such as South-South agreements, preferential integration 
in goods may bring little benefits.
9 Exploring other integration dimensions such as services 
(Mattoo and Sauvé 2010), investment (Miroudot 2010) and labor mobility (Hufbauer and 
Stephenson 2010), where complementarities might be desirable could be a promising next step 
(see for instance in the case of PAFTA, Hoekman and Sekkat, 2010). 
Yet the reality is that even if some limited sectoral advances have been witnessed in recent 
agreements (on movement of professionals for instance), PTAs have made modest inroads in 
terms of services market access. Regulatory policies tend to pursue non economic objectives 
while harboring economic concerns as well, such as the need to lower the cost of barriers and 
compliance. Hoekman, Mattoo and Sapir (2007) remark that this makes for a particularly 
complex political economy calculus: as is the case for tariffs, transaction costs imposed by deep 
integration policies will result in incumbent industries to resist liberalization sheltered by this 
protection. However, the bias against liberalization can be reinforced in the case of services by 
reluctance from consumers and government as well. Consumers may fear that regulatory 
liberalization will affect their well-being, for instance through slacker standards and lower 
quality of product and services.
10 Likewise government and regulatory agencies may see 
liberalization reluctantly: first, regulation may be a source of indirect taxation, when 
governments benefit from rents generated by regulatory protection (this is for instance a common 
occurrence in the area of standards); second, governments may fear that their latitude to pursue 
regulatory objectives will be curtailed as cross-border supply could undermine local suppliers 
while being subject to different (lower) regulatory requirements; third, governments also pursue 
redistribution objectives for instance through universal provision requirements (water, 
telecommunications, postal services), and obligations to offer the poorest consumers below-cost 
prices (water, electricity, finance, transport). 
                                                   
8 Allowing services to be traded under several modal forms such as for instance medical diagnostics now being able 
to be provided by distance thanks to electronic imagery. 
9 Small countries with similar production structures, small and inefficient manufacturing sectors might not have 
much to gain from engaging in goods-only PTAs. 
10 Note that here well-being could be understood in broad terms as not only including economic welfare, but also 
value-related preferences. 11 
 
Hoekman et al. (2007) further note that not only the political economy calculations become more 
complex in this environment, but also the usual reciprocity mechanism of trade liberalization 
may not work anymore because it becomes very difficult to separate clearly measures that 
promote market access and measures that pursue legitimate regulatory objectives. 
Notwithstanding the market access considerations, PTAs have also a role to play when it comes 
to transnational regulation. This reflects the standard economic efficiency motive for regulation, 
which is to address market failures. Three oft-mentioned market failures are: 1) tackle monopoly 
power; 2) deal with externalities and the provision of public goods; and 3) mitigate information 
asymmetries. 
2.1.3  Monopoly power and supranational competition 
With the existence of economies of scale and more generally market failures the possibility of 
monopoly power and abusive conduct by private firms arises. Trade liberalization may go some 
way to create competition by making markets contestable, but this will not always be sufficient. 
As discussed above, domestic enforcement of competition rules is linked to market access. If a in 
a national jurisdiction there is weak competition because of lack of enforcement, market 
concentration and collusion in domestic market may deter entry from foreign suppliers. In such 
instances, competition policy should complement trade liberalization in order to secure the gains 
from the opening of markets.  
Yet, the threat of market power and abusive conduct may not be sufficient to justify the inclusion 
of competition rules and discipline in a PTA on economic motives alone. After all, countries can 
individually opt to implement competition policies unilaterally. But these may not be effective in 
dealing with the risk of cross-border externality and the abusive behavior of exporters abroad. 
Competition rules may be particularly relevant in PTAs where the risk of abuse of market power 
or collusive practice takes place in more than one national jurisdiction and that international 
legislation and cooperation is required to put an end to or sanction it. For instance, a firm may 
use its market power in one market to extract monopoly rents in another, a dominant position 
may span several countries (e.g., Microsoft) potentially leading to anticompetitive market 
conduct, or firms may have agreed in one jurisdiction to collude in another, therefore requiring 
cooperation between authorities in order to collect evidence.  12 
 
Since such competition issues are trade and investment related, there are also complementarities 
in dealing with them in the same forum as trade arrangements. PTAs offer a scope to create 
disciplines that the WTO does not offer. Arguably the degree of cooperation in international 
competition arrangements will depend on individual economies sizes, the level of trade, and also 
the extent of their enforcement capacity.  
2.1.4  Externalities and public goods 
An externality (or transaction spillover) is a cost or benefit, not transmitted through prices, 
incurred by a party who did not participate in the action causing the cost or benefit. Externalities 
are not necessarily confined within the borders of a given countries (climate change for instance 
or depletion of fish stocks), and in some cases may be best tackled by a small group of countries. 
For instance river management should involve neighboring countries, as do some transport 
issues. Externalities are closely related to the need to provide public goods, i.e. goods that are 
non-rivalrous and non-excludable.
11 Markets may fail to spontaneously provide goods that are 
socially desirable (such as clean air) in the presence of externalities.  
Addressing regional externalities should logically be a priority of regional PTAs given the need 
for some form of supranational coordination to help internalize the externalities. Coordination 
can take several forms:  
1.  Alignment (for instance through mutual recognition agreements) and/or harmonization of 
policies to eliminate segmentation of markets and duplication of the costs generated by 
barriers at the border.  
2.  Alignment and harmonization of policies to avoid “leakage”. This is for instance when 
one jurisdiction in the PTA has lower regulatory standards, thus possibly undermining 
regulatory efforts of its trading partners. One example is deficient control of animal 
epizooties or pests in one country that spill over neighbors as animal border crossings 
cannot be totally controlled. 
3.  Alignment and harmonization of policies to create networks and facilitate information 
exchange. This essentially relates to the adoption of common standards and regulatory 
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language in order to facilitate flows within the region (for instance ensuring 
interoperability of national networks at a regional level). Sectors where this seems of 
particular relevance are services sectors such as financial and insurance, IT, professional 
services, transport and electricity. 
4.  Pulling of efforts to create infrastructure, or of resources (financial, human) to provide a 
regional public good. Large infrastructure serving a region such as a hydroelectric dam or 
a large port are examples where pooled financing might be needed. 
5.  Joint decision making to ensure that national policies are coordinated at the regional level 
(e.g. management of food stocks). 
6.  Transfer of resources to solve externality problems when the contribution of individual 
member states is required. A common instance is when institutions are weak and capacity 
building is required to bring a partner country to a higher standard for the regional 
common good (e.g. customs enforcement).   
Regional externalities should arguably be dealt over the jurisdiction over which they occur; 
therefore they require transnational mechanisms of cooperation. However, it is not entirely clear 
whether regional externalities (positive or negative) should necessarily be addressed in the 
specific context of a PTA. There is always the possibility (as for all commitments agreed in 
PTAs) to address these issues through dedicated agreements and transnational institutions such 
as bilateral customs or water management agreements for instance. Historically, many of these 
problems have been addressed this way.  
2.1.5  Information asymmetries 
Product characteristics are often not discernible to buyers before consumption. Such goods are 
called experience and credence goods. While experience goods reveal their characteristics upon 
consumption (e.g. the quality of a product cannot be observed before), credence goods do not 
(e.g. chemicals may be harmful to health, unbeknownst to people exposed to them). Information 
asymmetries may also affect producers themselves when consumers’ characteristics are hidden 
(e.g. the problem of insurance). While in most instances the market itself tackles these 
information asymmetries through information and brand signaling, when the asymmetries are not 
addressed the market outcome is suboptimal. The problem of information is particularly acute for 14 
 
services due to their intangibility, which makes harder for the buyer to learn about quality prior 
to consumption (Hoekman, Mattoo and Sapir, 2007). 
Regulation may then be called for, for instance through licensing or imposing compulsory 
standards. International cooperation may thus help reduce the overall complexity of the 
regulatory framework for international traders by aligning and harmonizing regulations. It may 
also be the case that failing to tackle some of these issues in a coordinated fashion may generate 
negative externality effects. 
In the specific PTA context the test will then be to assess whether information asymmetry 
problems are best tackled at the bilateral or plurilateral level, rather than in other international 
forums. In most instances, this will be a question of judging the tradeoffs between the transaction 
costs of cooperating with a given number of countries (or the international community) and the 
benefits of coordination at the global or PTA level. Taking the example of regional standards, 
there is a clear risk that standards may exclude third non adhering countries. However, it may be 
much easier to agree on a common approach with a small number of countries and with countries 
with similar preferences. Finally, in some cases (e.g. regional epizooties) a country-group 
approach will be the needed one.  
2.2  Societal motives 
Beyond the economic motives, a PTA can be motivated by a number of societal motives or 
value-related demands as Bhagwati (2008) calls them. Each society has moral and social 
preferences that may be undermined by market forces if left to their own devices. For instance 
the trading of dangerous weapons or morally/religiously reprehensible material may need to be 
restricted. What is considered dangerous or morally reprehensible will vary significantly for each 
country and culture. 
Social norms and values may be undermined by trade liberalization: after all it is still easier to 
control borders than a whole territory, and foreign producers may not hold themselves up to the 
same standards as the nationally chosen ones. This has long been recognized in multilateral trade 
agreements with the possibility of safeguard provisions and general exceptions (on moral 
grounds for instance). At the same time, the mechanisms of safeguard and the language of 
general exceptions may be found to be insufficient and therefore countries may want to negotiate 15 
 
sector specific provisions in PTAs, such as for instance reservations in the opening of services 
sectors to meet universal provision. 
At the opposite of using trade agreements as safeguards, they also serve as vehicles to further 
societal objectives too. Development policy concerns, for example, are increasingly present in 
agreements, such as in the EU sponsored EPAs. Another instance of issue pushed by Northern 
partners relates to good governance, democracy, labor rights and human rights (Elliot 2010; 
Aaronson, 2010).  
What is then the specific value added of PTAs in helping achieve these objectives? A first 
motivation might be that the threat to societal preferences is localized in a limited number of 
partners and thus it makes more sense to deal with them directly. Narcotics production is one 
instance and explains why some PTAs have been specifically linked to measures to fight again 
production and trafficking such as CAFTA in the US (Hornbeck, 2003). 
PTAs might be seen as the locus of positive spillovers between trade and these policy issues. For 
instance, provisions on governance – open and transparent procedures – for international flows 
arising from the trade agreement would spill over in other domestic areas.
12 Clearly, in the case 
of trade and development, there are complementarities between openness and poverty alleviating 
growth and again PTAs help target specific countries. In other instances, and more prosaically, 
this might be merely the outcome of a quid pro quo between market access in the North and 
concessions on other fronts in the South.  
A second motivation relates to the choice of the best available forum (see also section 2.3.2 
below) for promoting the international sharing of such values, either focusing on issues that are 
not already present in other agreements such as the WTO (for instance on labor rights or 
environment protection) or pushing for higher standards than currently existing in the 
international community. This is for instance a clear objective of the US new trade policy of 
pursuing PTAs that was initiated under the Bush administration. In a 2001 speech then-
Ambassador Robert Zoellick said: “... we need to align the global trading system with our values. 
[...] We can encourage respect for core labor standards, environmental protection, and good 
                                                   
12 According to Levy (2009), several mechanisms could be at play: once a bureaucracy commits to good 
governance, it may make little sense to maintain a different attitude for the domestic market; good governance for 
international flows could serve as a signal spurring reform on the domestic front; there might be costly and adverse 
reputational spillovers if the rule of law is not followed in the country that may affect the decision of foreign 
investors and traders. 16 
 
health [...] And we must always seek to strengthen freedom, democracy and the rule of law”.
13 
Related to this is the desire to use every trade forum to reaffirm these choices with a view of 
mutual complementarity and reinforcement between these different instruments. 
2.3  Political economy motives  
Beyond the need for coordinated policy making with trading partners, PTAs also serve as forums 
for policy objectives that are neither strictly related to exchanges nor to the preferential nature of 
PTAs. PTAs can be seen as efficient fora to achieve broader geopolitical, institutional, and 
policy anchoring objectives. 
2.3.1  Geopolitical 
Geostrategic considerations have historically commanded the formation of PTAs. There are 
numerous examples of trade agreements that have been used to promote peace. Chief among 
them is the European Union, which was borne from the desire to prevent war again in Europe. 
Winston Churchill called in 1946 for a “United States of Europe,” but it is through economic 
integration and the 1951 European Steel and Coal Community that European integration duly 
started (Winters, 1997; Baldwin, 2008).
14 Others examples of agreements used for stability 
purposes include Mercosur, and APEC (Bergsten, 1996). More recently, the push by the USA to 
conclude PTA has also been motivated by foreign policy motives (Bhagwati, 2008; Evenett and 
Meier, 2008), as is Europe’s neighborhood policy (European Commission, 2007).
15 
Thus PTAs can contribute to deliver peace and stability as a regional public good (Winters and 
Schiff, 2004; and box 2.6 in World Bank, 2005). Two mechanisms may come into play. First 
trade exchanges increase economic interdependency and thus act as a disincentive for conflict.
16 
They also may contribute to increase familiarity and trust and help diffuse trade related disputes. 
                                                   
13 As quoted by Evenett and Meier (2008). 
14 The choice of Coal and Steel was not only on the premise of the economic importance of the two sectors, but also 
because these were considered to be the main inputs to making weapons: “The pooling of coal and steel production 
should immediately provide for the setting up of common foundations for economic development as a first step in 
the federation of Europe, and will change the destinies of those regions which have long been devoted to the 
manufacture of munitions of war, of which they have been the most constant victims”. Robert Schuman, Declaration 
of 9 May 1950. 
15 “The EU can make an important contribution by working around the conflict issues, promoting similar reforms on 
both sides of the boundary lines, to foster convergence between political, economic and legal systems, enabling 
greater social inclusion and contributing to confidence building”. 
16 World Bank (2005) notes that some wars started out partly as trade disputes such as the U.S. Civil War (1861-65) 
and the Soccer War (1969) between El Salvador and Honduras. 17 
 
Second and more specific to PTAs, institutions themselves serve as a conduit for diplomacy, 
allowing for frequent and repeated officials interaction, and better exchange of information 
(Haftel, 2007). Deep PTAs seem more attractive in this respect since they exhibit more 
sophisticated institutions. 
Empirically, Mansfield and Pevehouse (2003) found that membership in a PTA significantly 
decreases the likelihood of armed conflict. More recently, Lee and Pyun (2009) provide 
statistically significant evidence that PTA institutions decrease the probability of conflict 
between members. WTO membership on the other hand seems only marginally significant. 
Mayer et al. (2010) test the interaction between conflict and PTAs over the period 1950-2000 
and find that the hypothesis of geopolitical motivations behind the agreements is supported by 
evidence. Yet for PTAs to help ease the probability of conflict there must be the scope of 
sufficiently large trade gains between the partners: economics and political motives thus 
complement each other. 
2.3.2  Institutions for reform 
By offering a different set of institutions, and related services than other forms of international 
agreements, PTAs provide an infrastructure for institutional dialogue and cooperation. As noted 
by the World Bank (2005), many issues covered by PTAs (such as the externality problems 
described above) could well be handled without a trade agreement, but if they are this must be 
because PTAs are perceived to offer a good framework to make progress. 
PTAs are relatively flexible instruments in so far as they allow for various levels of legal 
commitments and nearly infinite ways of creating policy space. Taking the specific case of 
dispute settlement, the options are numerous: no mechanism at all, or one or several dispute 
settlement mechanisms. Each PTA can come with its own ad hoc mechanisms, including sector 
specific mechanisms or referring to external mechanisms such as international arbitration or 
WTO dispute settlement. Before dispute settlement per se, various ways of reaching settlement 
are provided from good offices, to third party mediation, and conciliation. Indirect evidence of 
legal flexibility is also provided by Horn et al. (2009) who show that binding and non-binding 
provisions coexist in agreements in nearly all issues covered. Note that such flexibility might 
appear as a virtue to policy makers but may not be necessarily so in terms of achieving factual 
reform. 18 
 
Innovative institutions are also a feature of many PTAs, not found in particular in the multilateral 
forums. Involvement of the private sector is one of them, from involvement in stakeholder 
forums to the ability for private parties to lodge complaints as with the European Court of 
Justice, the General Secretariat of the Andean Community or the NAFTA investment provisions 
(Porges, 2010). Some PTAs also offer more substantial transfers of sovereignty. Governments 
can also opt to devolve some of their authority to institutions created by PTAs such as regional 
competition authorities, as described by Dawar and Holmes (2010). 
Transaction costs of agreeing are lower in PTAs where the number of participating countries is 
low. It also makes free riding more difficult, a key obstacle to successful global liberalization 
(Krugman, 1993). Lower transaction costs, both allow for more binding constraints each partner 
(non cooperation is more difficult), as well as also allowing for further legal flexibility with the 
possibility to amend, and revisit PTAs more frequently than multilateral agreements (as the 
numbers required to reach consensus is lower). Smaller number of participant countries enables 
more frequent and probably less formal interactions, which can contribute to problem solving 
and deeper interactions. This seems an important feature for regulatory dimensions, which 
require agreeing on complex issues (such as mutual recognition agreements) and the setting up of 
expert bodies. This is the road followed by the European Union under the Florence process. 
Resource transfers are more likely to occur in the framework of PTAs than in other international 
agreement settings. It is a fact that many PTAs, North-South in particular, incorporate such 
transfers. Agreements signed by the EU are the most striking examples, but other examples 
include US FTAs with Latin American partners, and South-South agreements like COMESA. 
Resource transfers matter in particular for deep and asymmetric PTAs. Arguably deep 
integration creates heavier demand on capacity. Less developed trade partners may not have the 
capacity to meet the regulatory standards of their partners and thus grant them effective market 
access, compensate for some of the adjustment costs of reform, contribute effectively to the 
production of regional public goods, and even more broadly when transfers help them meet some 
of the geopolitical and societal objectives mentioned earlier (development, conflict prevention, 
etc.).  19 
 
2.3.3  Policy anchoring  
A traditional political economy explanation for binding international trade commitments is the 
pursuit of a domestic reform agenda and the use of external commitments to “lock-in” the 
progress and prevent future reversals. The opportunity of lock-in is also a motive for including 
behind the border aspects in agreements. PTAs may be perceived as more effective lock-in 
mechanisms than other international agreements. PTAs would also complement other 
instruments in the process of external lock-in of reforms. 
By extending their reach to regulatory issues PTAs offer a way to improve policy credibility 
(Hoekman 2010). What are the differences then between the sort of anchor offered by PTAs and 
the one provided by the WTO? Aside from the obvious point that PTAs may offer commitments 
in WTO-plus and WTO-extra areas, other aspects may point to specific advantages offered by 
them. The possibility of picking a partner may help reinforce the credibility aspect, as the partner 
of choice may be perceived as a strong proponent of reform. Indeed, the EU, the US and other 
developed countries promote various agendas through their respective PTAs. Picking a partner of 
a group of partners may also signal a preference for a certain regulatory approach. Additionally, 
lock-in by the means of PTAs can be complemented by transfers of finance and knowledge. 
Another argument, put forward by Schiff and Winters (1998) is that PTAs may actually be better 
suited for locking-in policies because enforcement threats are more credible there. Incentives to 
enforce commitments are higher in a PTA because it limits the possibility of free riding and 
coordination problems that may arise in multilateral forums. Also, there is more scope for 
retaliation as concessions may go beyond just tariffs in a PTA. Schiff and Winters however note 
that the disciplining effect is only limited to the extent of partner countries in the PTA, not third 
country members.
17 These dynamics are echoed by the conclusion reached by Prusa (2010) that 
PTAs tend to discipline the use of contingent protection measures among partners, while at the 
same time there seems to be an increase of the use of protection against third countries. 
There are several recent examples of countries that have used PTAs to pursue an ambitious 
domestic agenda. Schott (2003) refers to Mexico and Chile. Likewise, Eastern European 
countries accession to the EU was strongly motivated by the desire to irrevocably break with 
socialism and consolidate their market economy reforms. More recently, Costa Rica and Peru 
                                                   
17 They refer to the peso crisis of 1994-95 when Mexico raised its tariffs on 500 items on non-NAFTA suppliers. 20 
 
used their FTA negotiations with the US to push domestic reforms. Levy (2009) reviews the 
motivations behind the US-Peru FTA and cannot really see much market access motives for 
Peru, save for securing greater certainty about future access (trading temporary preferences for 
more permanent ones). In contrast, the agreements helped Peru cement its economic policy 
reforms. Some were part of the FTA implementation program, notably in the areas of services 
and investment, but the agreement also helped lock-in prior policy reforms (such as tariff 
reductions). Levy (2009) also sees among the Peruvian motivations to sign the FTA with the US 
the hope that it would generate broader positive spillover effects on Peru’s governance and rule 
of law. By imposing good disciplines to protect foreign investors and market access, the FTA 
would signal a commitment to a better legal environment more broadly.  
In sum, it would appear that there are strong rationales for policy makers to embark into deep 
and comprehensive PTAs but the relative merits of regional integration are also issue and 
country specific. The choice to include regulatory aspects in PTAs is essentially dictated by a 
dual concern: market access and addressing market failures, national (through lock-in effect of 
policy reform and policy upgrading) and regional (through tackling of cross-border market 
failures). Market failures will be of different nature and involve different set of countries 
depending on the sector and issue at hand, hence the need, as for any regulation to take a case-
by-case approach. Other non-economic factors such as fostering societal choices may also apply 
for some issues of regulatory nature. Finally, specific institutional characteristics and advantages 
may also motivate the choice of PTAs as adequate forums for reform. 
3  Deep PTAs are different 
While creating opportunities, the increased scope and depth of PTAs pose extra challenges to 
policy makers as they tread the complex market access and regulatory web of PTAs. Deep 
integration PTAs may require policy makers to re-evaluate their approach when negotiating and 
implementing PTAs. In particular, to what extent are the multiple motives pursued by PTAs 
consistent and congruent? Do new disciplines incorporated in PTAs create a different category of 
obligations? Does the deepening and popularity of PTAs create new challenges to the 
multilateral trading system? In this section we suggest four major areas of focus for policy 
makers, especially in developing countries, as they refine their regional trade strategies: (1) to 21 
 
reexamine the question of discrimination and preferential access; (2) to favor a holistic approach; 
(3) to build in flexibility; and (4) to focus on implementation. 
3.1  It's not so much about preferences   
Are the traditional concerns of discriminatory liberalization valid for the new areas of deep 
commitments in PTAs? Do deep integration measures generate trade diversion? Can it harm the 
liberalization country? Do they act as stumbling blocks to further liberalization? These issues, in 
particular those relating to the impact of deep integration on multilateral architecture have 
generated sizeable interest of late (OECD, 2003; Baldwin et al., 2009; Estevadeordal et al., 
2009), thanks to mounting evidence provided by new PTAs. The three classical economic 
concepts to analyze market access discrimination in PTAs (i.e., trade diversion, third party 
effects, and systemic effects) are applied below to the new regulatory commitments found in 
today’s PTAs. 
3.1.1  Trade diversion matters less 
Discrimination in deep integration agreements can secure the benefits of market access without 
generating the potential cost of trade diversion.
18 In this sense regulatory discrimination does not 
raise the same concerns as tariff discrimination would. Taking together the certitude that better 
market access will be beneficial, and that no diversion costs will occur, leads to an important 
consideration for policy makers. All things equal PTA partners will unambiguously gain in 
preferential deep integration efforts. This may explain why deep integration issues are gaining 
popularity in PTAs.  
Protection afforded by lack of regulatory openness is not necessarily protectionist in intent. 
Regulatory requirements often impose a transaction cost on the exporter without corresponding 
rents for the home country.
19 No rent is created, just an inefficiency loss. A case in point is 
superfluous or antiquated border controls, which create additional costs without any 
corresponding benefits.
20  
                                                   
18 This point is made by Fink and Mattoo (2002) and Evenett et al. (2008). 
19 Thus it does not necessarily generate positive terms of trade effects for the home country (the customs duties 
revenue in the case of tariff protection). 
20 In most cases the situation is not that clear cut. Regulatory burden often creates additional jobs for administrations 
and also provides opportunity for graft or for indirect taxation. 22 
 
In such instances, liberalization of services, standards, trade facilitation, investment liberalization 
and openness of government procurement can generate benefits even if done on a preferential 
basis. It is however important to stress that this positive effect only occurs under the condition of 
no rent transfer from domestic to foreign producers.
21 In services trade, for instance, the impact 
of preferential liberalization will vary depending on the nature of the regulatory barriers present. 
If lack of competition is an issue, regulatory liberalization may well substitute a domestic 
monopolist practice with a foreign one (Mattoo and Sauvé, 2010). Likewise where services 
market access is subject to some form of licensing, rents may arise and so the cost of trade 
diversion. In the case of government procurement, there is an additional aspect at work. 
Restrictive and discriminatory government procurement rules do not affect the market as a whole 
and therefore exclude suppliers only from serving the public share of the domestic demand 
(Dawar and Evenett, 2010). Depending on the size of public markets, this may not be enough to 
exclude foreign suppliers from the market altogether. 
3.1.2  What about the impact on third parties? 
Turning now to the impact on third parties, the standard effect of discrimination will still be 
harmful for excluded countries. This is for instance the case when countries adopt European 
standards instead of international ones (Maur and Shepherd, 2010). However, it is important to 
ask whether preferential measures are always discriminatory. 
An important characteristic of regulatory measures is that de jure preferential treatment might be 
difficult to apply and therefore de facto MFN liberalization is a preferable option. This is because 
devising a new regulatory regime applicable for each PTA may be impracticable or more simply 
because the concept of rules of origin that applies to product characteristics cannot as easily 
apply to regulations or intangible transactions.
22 For instance, provisions on intellectual property 
rights protection apply equally to all origins, including domestic ones. Carving out specific 
regimes for some countries (as in the case of the article 6 exception for LDCs in the WTO 
agreement) requires complex legal and practical arrangements. Similarly for customs procedures, 
while trade rules may differ depending on the origin of product, it makes sense to keep as much 
                                                   
21 And therefore no prior rent capture by domestic interests since the objective of regulatory controls is not to raise 
revenue or afford protection. 
22 The distinction is often blurred and when identification methods are imperfect, origin is often used as a very 
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as possible similar procedures regardless of the origin of the good because most objectives of 
border controls apply to all imports. Those examples show that the concern of negative impact 
on excluded parties can largely disappear in the case of deep commitment provisions and that, 
instead, preferential liberalization could generate positive externalities on third countries.
23  
This is however not a universal rule. A characteristic of deep integration liberalization is that 
there are instances when discrimination is inevitable and even necessary. The main illustration of 
this conclusion is provided by mutual recognition agreements (MRAs). MRAs can be negotiated 
in any regulatory area and are basically a way to lower barriers to entry into the domestic market 
for foreign producers without outright harmonization of rules, and thus enabling to preserve 
regulatory diversity and allowing countries to maintain national objectives and preferences. By 
this principle, parties agree in essence to keep their own regulatory ways, provided that they both 
meet minimum common objectives. Recognition can be agreed both for regulatory standards and 
the testing of these standards, and in several areas: services (e.g. professional standards, 
transport), trade facilitation (e.g. declarations made with foreign customs), and of course 
technical barriers to trade and phytosanitary measures. Another instance when discrimination is 
needed relates to customs controls. Modern and efficient risk-based border management calls for 
the selective control of imports to focus on categories that present the highest risk of non-
compliance. Risk criteria discriminate for instance by product category, country of origin and 
identity of shipper (such as in the case of simplified controls for authorized economic operators 
and express shippers). 
Finally, the fact that liberalization in preferential settings could de-facto lead to MFN 
liberalization has profound implications in terms of overall liberalization negotiating strategy. 
Concessions given to one partner cannot be again offered again to another, when they are non-
discriminatory and implicitly offered to the rest of the world. One implication might be that such 
liberalization is harder to obtain because more likely to be resisted by domestic firms that would 
not only loose to the preferential partners as would be usually the case in a trade diverting PTA, 
but to the world as a whole (Krishna, 1998). This also undermines the reciprocity rationale for 
signing North-South agreements, as negotiating market access preferences for goods (the 
objective of the South) against deep regulatory commitments (the objective of the North) seems 
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to make little sense for developing countries. Preferences are bound to be eroded over time, 
whereas regulatory commitments are both permanent and MFN. Alternatively, as argued by 
Limão (2007) this asymmetry could provide also an incentive for PTAs to maintain high barriers 
against third countries (high preferences) to provide greater incentives for cooperation in non-
trade areas and make the threat of preference erosion a more distant reality. 
Another related consideration is that there could be a premium for parties that want to export a 
certain regulatory model, more advantageous to their own firms, to be the first to negotiate with a 
given country. This may be one aspect of the competitive liberalization framework described by 
Bergsten (1996).  
3.1.3  Deep integration as a building block  
Are deep commitments in PTAs building or stumbling blocks to multilateral liberalization? This 
is a legitimate question, given that the slew of new commitments in PTAs makes these 
agreements much more complex and by adding new dimensions, may create even more hurdles 
toward the welfare superior objective of multilateral liberalization. Even considering the more 
traditional aspect of tariff preferential liberalization, the answer to this question is not entirely 
clear, with some arguing that PTAs fundamentally undermine the multilateral system (the 
“termites” of Bhagwati), and others seeing in PTAs a component of an overall dynamic of 
liberalization (Baldwin and Freund, 2010). 
In the context of deep integration, similar concerns prevail. How do complex and largely ad hoc 
PTAs touching on services and behind the border measures interplay with the multilateral order? 
Part of the answer was provided in the previous section, when the point was made that 
liberalization is often MFN in nature, thereby removing concerns about stumbling block effects 
in these instances. There is also more to this story, as discussed by Baldwin, Evenett and Low 
(2009), and in OECD (2003). Several mechanisms supporting a further liberalization are actually 
found in PTA provisions. 
  A first instance is when adherence to international standards is advocated in PTAs, such 
as for sanitary and phyto-sanitary measures and technical barriers to trade (Lesser, 2007). 
Numerous also are the PTAs that refer directly to WTO rules. 25 
 
  A second mechanism at play is that of “third-party,” “non-party” MFN clauses. Such 
clauses are often found in services provisions (Fink and Molinuevo, 2007), and in 
government procurement (Baldwin et al., 2009). According to third-party MFN rules, 
future and more advantageous commitments with other partners should be granted to 
PTA partners as well thus triggering automatic liberalization. As noted by Baldwin et al. 
(2009), a benefit of such rules is to avail small countries from the bargaining power of 
more powerful countries with common trade partner and benefit from increased market 
access this way. 
  A third mechanism is when regimes operate under liberal rules of origin (ROO) (or 
liberal “denial of benefits” provisions). ROOs do not only occur for preferential trade in 
goods, but in any instance requiring establishing the origin of the partner subject to 
preferential rules. This includes various instances in PTAs, such as access by third parties 
to MRAs, ROOs applying to foreign firms establishing local presence (mode 3) in the 
partner country (Mattoo and Sauvé, 2010), or government procurement (Dawar and 
Evenett, 2010).
24 Rules of origin applying to regulations happen often to be liberal, 
because it either becomes complex to operate them or because as we saw earlier it does 
not make sense to operate parallel regulatory systems instead of an MFN one. 
  A fourth phenomenon at play is the diffusion of identical and liberalizing rules in PTAs. 
This is a phenomenon that has been in particular noted in “contiguous” PTAs having one 
partner in common. This is what for instance happens in investment provisions in 
agreements in North and South America, in procurement provisions, and in contingent 
protection (Baldwin et al., 2009). This however, could have a downside as large trading 
powers export their own – and not necessarily compatible – vision of a liberalization 
agenda. Prusa (2010) describes also a phenomenon of rules diffusion with the EU and US 
acting as spokes in their respective networks. More broadly, template approaches to 
liberalization are often used in PTAs. Rules relating to investment, services liberalization 
or standards tend to replicate one of two or three existing models.  
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entity such as nationality of people controlling the firm. 26 
 
In sum, discrimination on the implementation of deep commitments in PTAs should not be 
underestimated but there are also ways to deal with it. It should not be underestimated because 
deep integration creates stealthier and more complex ways to discriminate. Trade partners can 
push for specific regimes designs aimed at carving out more favorable market access conditions. 
One example is the insistence by the United States to include customs rules in its FTAs that 
allow for a preferential treatment for express carriers.
25 However, the parallel with the tariff 
analysis of preferential liberalization does not necessarily hold: the risk of trade diversion is less 
a concern. This impacts the welfare implications of preferential liberalization which are then 
necessarily positive. Thus PTAs would in such cases contribute to overall welfare gain. 
Moreover the rather complex nature of regulation tends to work to the advantage of MFN 
liberalization as it is often too complicated to manage multiple regulatory regimes to create 
specific preferences. 
3.2  It’s about policy complementarities 
The expansion of PTAs into new disciplines implies that policy makers are confronted with 
multiple policy choices with different objectives and complex interactions. In essence new PTAs 
capture a broader paradigm than traditional ones. Evans et al. (2006) characterize one aspect of 
this expanded paradigm by pointing out that unlike traditional trade liberalization that focuses 
chiefly on goods trade, deep integration aims at broad factor mobility, including investment 
(capital movement) liberalization, services, migration and labor standards dimensions (labor 
movement). Perhaps nowhere more than in PTAs are all the liberalization dimensions explored 
as deeply and comprehensively. The complementarities thus created might then explain the 
attraction of PTAs (Mattoo and Sauvé, 2010). A good example is the trade facilitation agenda, 
which requires the streamlining of numerous border measures, all have specific regulatory 
objectives in many sectors (health, immigration, security controls for instance), the inclusion of 
services sectors that facilitate trade (transport, logistics, insurance, etc.), the consideration of 
movement of persons, standards policies, etc.  
The other aspect of the broader agenda is of course the regulatory one and the inclusion of 
domestic and other policies whose objective is not protection but to remedy some sort of market 
failure. The reason why such policies are included in PTAs is at least in part because trade 
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liberalization interacts with the objectives pursued under these policies in ways that may often be 
seen as making these objectives more difficult to achieve. Thus trade policies cannot be 
conceived anymore by assuming separability from other policies.
26  
Deep integration is as much about trade as it is about other dimensions of economic management 
and public policy. Starting with liberalization of services, all the deep integration policies meet 
specific objectives: the liberalization question cannot be divorced from the consideration of these 
objectives. Thus policy makers should carefully think about why and how trade agreements 
should serve these objectives in the specific context of PTAs. The table below offers a snapshot 
of their variety. 
Area Regulatory  objectives 
Services  Universal provision (access, prices) 
Standards (professional, safety, interconnection) 
Prudential regulations (banking) 
Cultural exception (media) 
Goods Standards  Human, plant and animals Health 
Safety 
Network economies 
IPRs Innovation  &  Creativity 




Enforcement of domestic laws on foreign goods 
Transit 
Government Procurement  Buy national provisions 
Sensitive sectors protection (defense) 
Consumer law  Consumer information and protection 
Labor & Human rights  Minimum standards 
Environment Public  goods 
Minimum standards 
Movement of persons  Immigration management 
Source: Authors   
 
In his book Termites in the Trading System (2008), Bhagwati pointedly mocks the notion of 
trade-related policies: “If I sneeze and use imported cough syrup, that immediately affects 
imports; if I use domestic cough syrup that potentially reduces exports of the syrup I have used 
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up”. It is true that by pushing the logic ad absurdum every issue becomes trade-related and has a 
trade effect. While this does not mean that the impact of policies on trade (and vice-versa) should 
be ignored, it is important to make a distinction about the primary objectives of policies and how 
to achieve them. The question therefore, for regulatory issues, which are in essence behind-the-
border and not unique or specific to traded goods, is of three orders: 
1.  What are the issues of true international dimension that can only be addressed through 
international agreements? 
2.  How should behind-the-border rules in PTAs be designed to minimize trade distortionary 
effects? 
3.  How should policy makers prepare themselves to negotiate or resist such rules? 
The first two questions roughly ask: what is the actual link with trade issues? On the first 
question, as seen earlier, market failures and externalities of supranational nature could be 
addressed using PTAs. For instance in the case of trade facilitation, international transit is clearly 
of regional dimension. Arguably, these issues can also be addressed in separate dedicated 
agreements, such as bilateral cooperation treaties for competition law or standalone transit 
agreements (see Dawar and Holmes, 2010; Maur, 2008). International trade may also be an 
important source of market failure, for instance on environment protection (Anuradha, 2010).
27 
Because of the binding nature of international agreements and the international trade dimension 
of externalities and market failures, there is a space for regulatory frameworks in the context of 
PTAs. Issues that were previously dealt under dedicated bilateral instruments, such as Bilateral 
Investment Treaties, Customs Cooperation Agreements, and Competition policy cooperation, are 
now increasingly incorporated into PTAs. Although the jury is still out as to the most effective 
instrument in terms of implementation, PTAs may be superior instruments in two respects: the 
possibility of issues-linkages, and institution-savings costs since one body serves several 
purposes (Devlin and Estevadeordal, 2006). 
On the second question of reducing distortionary effects, the approach should be to minimize the 
conflicts of objectives between regulatory and trade liberalization objectives. For instance, 
harmonization to low standards level would maximize trade liberalization objectives, but clearly 
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not meet regulatory objectives (countries may have different objectives, and low standards may 
not meet their preferred level of enforcement). An obvious approach is to ensure that clarity of 
regulatory objectives is such that any protectionist intent cannot hide themselves behind the 
disguise of rules. Hidden protectionism operates by raising the costs of (foreign) rivals, which 
can be achieved both by discriminatory rules at home (e.g. standards designed in such a way as 
to exclude foreign products) or raising standards abroad (e.g. by exporting new regulatory 
requirements that increase the cost of production there and shift comparative advantage patterns). 
On the question of negotiating or resisting such rules, a first step is to clarify the policy making 
process involved in taking future commitments, starting by involving key ministries and 
administrations overseeing the non-trade objectives and ensure mutual understanding and 
coherence of objectives. Historically, PTA negotiations have typically been led by the finance, 
foreign affairs or trade ministry. These ministries would seldom coordinate with other ministries 
or specialized bodies of government, and sometimes with limited understanding of issues at 
stake. A second set of measures is to minimize the costs of meeting the regulatory objectives 
with reasonable statistical confidence. This is often not done, as instead solutions that meet the 
objective of regulation irrespective of the costs caused by trade distortions are chosen. The 
notion of risk is often not embedded in the regulatory design since agencies have no direct 
interest in considering the costs borne by other parts of the economy in meeting their objective, 
and will naturally opt for regulatory solutions that minimize risk rather than costs. An example is 
border controls, where 100% checking of consignments is not rare, at the expense of 
economically efficient methods of solely targeting risky shipments. Thus the marginal costs of 
meeting regulatory objectives (in particular the costs on trade) should be balanced with the 
marginal expected benefits.
28 
Another important aspect that may justify resisting the incorporation of regulatory objectives in 
PTAs is the importance of national endowment and preferences, which will differ across 
countries. Bhagwati (2008) suggests that the rationales for different labor standards apply for 
countries that are at different stages of development and with different economic contexts. While 
harmonization eliminates the costs associated with duplication and complexity, it can undermine 
national objectives by departing too much from them, and also in the case of upward 
                                                   
28 See also Shepherd and Maur (2010) for a discussion of this in the context of standards.  30 
 
harmonization to stricter regulatory levels actually raise the costs faced by some countries. These 
countries are often the poorest ones. The exportation of (higher) regulatory standards and 
practices has been flagged in the recent literature as integral to the strategy of the two biggest 
proponents of PTAs: the US and Europe (Horn et al., 2009; Bhagwati, 2008; Maur, 2005). A 
closer examination of PTA disciplines indeed suggests that template approaches to PTA 
liberalization are indeed promoted by both hubs. This is worth highlighting as the EU and US 
approaches generally differ quite substantially. The influence of the EU and US hubs is for 
instance noted for contingent protection rules (Prusa, 2010), the use of mutual recognition versus 
equivalence for standards (Maur and Shepherd, 2010), different areas of focus for IPR protection 
(Fink, 2010), or the diffusion of procurement and investment rules (Miroudot, 2010; Dawar and 
Evenett, 2010). PTAs (and bilateral agreements in general) offer a solution to deal with 
heterogeneity of preferences through the principle of equivalence, which often takes the form of 
mutual recognition, which we discussed earlier.  
3.3  It’s about flexibility and customized problem solving 
The flexibility offered by PTAs in terms of tailoring the level of ambition of given disciplines 
according to the trading partners is one conclusion arising from the early work looking at the 
new wave of PTAs (Heydon, 2003). While special and differential treatment and policy space are 
an important feature of modern trade negotiations involving developing countries, we take here 
the logic further, arguing that it is not only the nature of partner countries and their capacity that 
dictates the need for such flexibility, but the regulatory issues themselves. 
Many of the new policies captured in the latest generation of PTAs do not lend themselves to be 
reduced to standalone legal language in a trade agreement. Rather, deep integration requires 
flexibility and customization in the way provisions are drafted: 
  Provisions in the agreement are only one of the blocks of broader cooperation that may 
include institutional arrangements, hard (e.g. a common institution) or soft (e.g. expert 
consultations), as well as technical assistance and capacity building; 
  Gradual implementation as reform may not be carried overnight and will present unique 
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  In particular joint projects such as harmonization work, setting up common regional 
tools, etc.; 
  Need to revisit areas of cooperation as regulatory needs change over time; 
  Need to revisit deep integration areas as understanding of how best to address regulatory 
dimensions evolve over time; 
  Need to monitor implementation of policy; 
  Need to recourse to other venues than dispute settlement; 
Reliance on a rigid interpretation of an international agreement and enforceable through dispute 
settlement is insufficient for deep integration dimensions of liberalization (Hoekman, 2010). 
Deep integration requires a combination of hard and soft law and capacity. The reasons for this 
are a) practicalities, b) uncertainty, and c) political economy. The appropriate implementation of 
behind the border policies requires a set of actions ranging from legal provisions, to 
establishment of adequate structures, including not only appropriate governance and rules, but 
also material and personnel to operationalize these policies, as well as reporting mechanisms. All 
this is highly complex and difficult to specify in full in an international agreement and may as 
well be dependent on the specificity of domestic structures. The second problem arises from the 
fact that there is uncertainty about what is the most appropriate design for regulatory policies and 
their outcomes, since this probably depend on countries circumstances. A good example of this is 
the variety of competition provision rules and set up in PTAs (Dawar and Holmes 2010). Inter 
alia, configurations on common competition regimes and provisions are largely influenced by 
national regimes, the size and level of development of partners. Another source of uncertainty is 
time, when technological changes for instance may affect fundamentally the nature of goods and 
services exchanged, how markets, market operators and government bodies conduct their work 
(as in telecom services, standard policies or border controls). Finally, the political economy of 
PTAs relying on soft law mechanisms might be more supportive of actual liberalization than a 
top-down approach when rules are rigidly imposed by a powerful trade partner. Ownership can 
be enhanced through cooperation and stakeholder involvement, which would be part of a process 
of identification of adapted regulatory solutions for liberalization (Hoekman 2010). This is in a 32 
 
way related to the respect of country preferences and a mechanism of reduction of differences 
towards agreeing on mutual recognition. 
Thus flexibility seems an important dimension to consider for deep integration dimension. Hence 
the recommendation for “living agreements” incorporating a work program and associated 
institutions that establish a pathway allowing deeper integration over time and the resolution of 
standards issue. Hoekman (2010) similarly argues in favor of a constructive versus adversarial 
process in North-South PTAs. Also, a problem with purely adversarial procedures is that they 
tend to leave unaddressed public good type of issues whereas supranational institutions have an 
incentive to take this forward. PTAs then become instruments of cooperation in addition of 
integration, and can provide a “problem solving” forum to countries undertaking reform and 
upgrading their regulatory capacity. 
Another aspect of the flexible approach to deep integration is the implications on approaches to 
dispute settlement. On the one hand, negotiating and implementing deep integration dimensions 
is costly and this provides a motive for ensuring a return on this investment by having strong 
dispute settlement mechanisms (Porges 2010). This may explain the observed trend towards 
more legalistic forms of dispute resolution, replacing more diplomatic approaches of older 
agreements. In this regard, the solution of WTO-like ad hoc panels (which allows among other 
things to draw on the expertise of specialists) is often preferred. On the other hand, dispute 
settlement is only one of the several mechanisms in PTAs contributing to enforcement. Panel 
type disputes are only in exceptional cases, and smaller disagreements are resolved through other 
channels established in PTAs. The latter is what can be described as soft law. In this respect, 
common institutions play an important role, allowing technical and ad hoc approaches to solving 
what are often complex issues. This also enables to involve third parties such as the private 
sector more easily. 
As already indicated, the extent to which a PTA is symmetrical or not – among partners of equal 
level of development or economic size – has implications on the choice of degree of flexibility 
and informality. In this sense, a flexible approach can very much be seen as a building block 
towards more formal arrangements down the line. Porges (2010) notes that dispute settlement 
tend to become more legalistic when the relationship is symmetric, whereas in the case of 
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way to provide flexibility to smaller partners and to reflect the unequal balance of power, it 
leaves also the solving of dispute to less transparent conduits where power wielding may be 
easier to use. 
3.4  It’s about implementation 
The insufficiency of a solely legalistic approach to commitments implies that negotiations will 
not settle every issue, and that in addition to the ex ante work of negotiators, an important ex post 
agenda awaits countries signing PTAs. It can be argued that the implementation agenda is on 
paper more important in the case of PTAs than it may be in the WTO. There are essentially two 
reasons to that. The first one is that PTAs commits parties to effective liberalization, when the 
WTO often only commits parties to bind only maximum levels of protection and provides 
numerous exemptions and exceptions for developing countries.
29 The second reason is that deep 
PTAs cover new and more ambitious ground than does the WTO. 
In some areas the track record of PTAs in implementation has been relatively poor. Review of 
services (Mattoo and Sauvé, 2010), and competition provisions (Dawar and Holmes, 2010) 
suggest unimpressive records, while in areas where there have been more pressures towards 
implementation such as IPRs, the evidence shows much more substantial changes (Biadgleng 
and Maur, 2010). The different treatment received in IPR is the direct result of implementation 
and enforcement being features that have gained prominence in recent PTAs involving the U.S. 
and Europe. 
Dealing with deep integration issues require preparedness that goes well beyond the negotiation 
stage, and most likely dedicating some permanent resources to managing the agreement. The 
resource and policy implications of deep integration agreement are likely to be in part 
unforeseen, as Hoekman (2005) suggested, and this may be compounded by the lack of 
preparedness of countries. Examples of possible unintended consequences of commitments 
include incompatibilities between PTA commitments and existing (domestic and international) 
                                                   
29 In terms of liberalization, PTAs will at least lock in the status quo if disciplines in an area are included. This is 
furthered by the use of negative list approaches such as in some services provisions. Thus the value of commitments 
in PTAs is higher than in the WTO. In this sense PTAs are more rigid. This may a reason why developed countries 
have intensively used PTAs with smaller developing countries, as a way to lock-in liberalization in a way that was 
not necessarily happening in the WTO. This means in return that with stricter commitments looming, resistance to 
liberalization may also be stronger. 34 
 
legal environment;
30 political economy constraints where commitments are not accepted by 
domestic constituencies (including legislators that may have to vote on new laws); limitations to 
regulatory freedom; inefficiency in implementing the new regulatory environment; and economic 
implications that are less beneficial than initially thought.  
One implication of regulatory dimensions is that beyond the principle of liberalization agreed in 
the PTA, a work program of implementation must be devised in order to make this a reality. The 
implementation of the provisions of an agreement may require different levels of intervention. 
First institutional changes may be required, as implementation of new areas of policy may call 
for setting up new regulatory agencies or the reorganizing of existing institutions. Second, 
regulatory reforms: the drafting of new laws will be required to reflect PTA commitments. This 
will vary depending on the legal standing of international commitments in domestic law (some 
require translation in domestic law while others have direct effect; also some law systems rely 
more on case-law approach). The third dimension of implementation consists of the 
administrative, procedural and operational changes required to comply with the new regulatory 
framework. This can include also the management itself of the agreement, including 
transparency, and monitoring requirements. Finally, enforcement of the newly adopted 
regulations needs to be considered. This relates also to the allocation of staff and resources to 
guarantee that the law is applied. “Quality” of enforcement considerations also applies, with 
measures of the effectiveness of how laws are applied (from Biadgleng and Maur, 2010). 
Since the text of the PTAs is only one starting element of the process of integration, 
implementation aspects must also be carefully examined to see whether liberalization is effective 
or not. Monitoring and accountability matter. This is a more complex process than verifying that 
trade barriers are effectively dismantled, and for which information is often not readily available. 
In general implementation in PTAs is not a very transparent process, and sustained attention to 
implementation is rare. This is an additional reason speaking in favor of taking a constructive 
cooperative approach argued by Hoekman (2005) given the complementarity between 
information generation and exchange, and the process of “discovery” of the best trade facilitating 
regulatory solution. 
                                                   
30 Biadgleng and Maur (2010) report the example of Egypt taking some commitments with the EU to ratify the 
International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV) Convention for the Protection of New 
Varieties of Plants, in contradiction with its own law. 35 
 
In spite of some evidence of monitoring,
31 information about implementation remains scarce and 
most of the analysis of PTAs rests on the evidence provided by the agreements themselves and 
some measures of outcomes such as trade flows. While such analysis provides useful insights, 
the policy recommendations that can be drawn from such analysis is limited. Little is known 
about which liberalization strategies work best as agents of change, and for instance which of the 
hard law, soft law approaches or combination thereof contribute most to liberalization. The 
inference from the above discussion is that while there are now many examples to refer to, and 
distinctive types of approaches to integration, there is still relatively little to recommend in terms 
of how to appropriately implement deep integration provisions in PTAs beyond a core set of 
principles.  
For developing countries, one attraction of PTAs with more developed partners is the prospect of 
access to capacity building and transfer of resources, at least in theory. Whether and how 
development assistance contributes to implementation is generally difficult to assess, and even 
more so in the context of PTAs given the naturally nontransparent nature of institutional 
dimensions.  
One important dimension that appears notably in the discussion on competition policy, 
government procurement and standards is to what extent the process of implementation should 
be driven from the centre or not. For instance, competition regimes in PTA contexts range from 
regional institutions to national institutions cooperating on international issues. Several 
considerations come into play affecting whether the implementation process will be left to 
national government or devolved to a transnational body (Dawar and Evenett, 2010). 
The first obvious point is that a prerequisite to common institutions or rules is the willingness of 
trade partners to abandon some of their sovereignty. When this is not the case (for instance often 
in context of North-South agreements), only “lighter” options remain, and only core principles 
guaranteeing good policy and governance can be agreed. This is for instance the solution chosen 
for procurement provisions. A related concern is the choice between maintaining national 
preferences and adopting international standards. In the context of standards as well, the answer 
                                                   
31 Examples are the USA which “certifies” implementation of FTAs before Congress approval, the EU which reports 
regularly in the case of accession and in more ad hoc fashion with other partners on implementation, APEC 
implementation action plans, and South-South agreements such as Comesa, where the Secretariat monitors country 
progress. 36 
 
to the question of harmonization vs. recognition depends on whether the benefits of 
harmonization outweigh the costs of loss of preferences. National ability to issue regulations is 
also a parameter to take into account. In particular, one dimension of preserving diversity in 
regulation and implementation is to derive the benefits from competition between different 
regulatory solutions and procedures. Messerlin and Zarrouk (2000) advocate for less 
centralization in the context of conformity assessment in order to promote competition between 
different conformity services. 
A second point is the degree of coordination that is required by the integration policy. For some 
transnational public goods, common institutions and a top-down approach may be required in 
order to solve the coordination problems that lead to inadequate supply of the goods. Beyond 
public goods per se, common institutions appear in particular necessary when frequent 
interactions, decision making, adjudication, and exchange of information is needed such as for 
instance in customs unions. A related dimension is the desire to achieve certain scale/efficiency 
effects. Competition policy illustrates the possibility of opting for a common centralized 
competition regime (such as in the case of the EU, Caribbean, Comesa, Andean Pact) when 
parties of a PTA do not differ much in terms of preferences over the type of competition 
enforcement. 
For developing countries in particular, a top-down approach may prove more attractive. A first 
incentive might be to improve governance. By decentralizing decision making within a PTA, 
member countries may be able to better anchor policies from the risk of reversal and guarantee 
its independence. Competition policy is a good example of this strategy, where it might be 
difficult in some countries to escape the influence of particularly large firms and thus discipline 
them. More generally anchoring could for instance be a rationale for countries with weak judicial 
systems to rely on supranational judicial institutions. Poor administrative resources at the country 
level could also motivate the pooling of resources among a group of countries, as small islands 
countries have done. Third efficiency motives may lead some countries to seek to replace their 
existing regulations by superior systems “imported” from partner countries and through the 
institutional mechanisms of the PTA get access to the superior expertise and systems of the 
partner country.  
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4  Conclusions 
Modern PTAs are fast evolving. They are increasingly deep and affect all countries and regions 
of the world, including the most remote quarters. As academics and policy makers try to deal 
with this new generation of PTAs, a few tentative conclusions can be made on this changing 
landscape.  
First, deep integration introduces a change of paradigm. To be sure PTAs are still about 
preferences, discrimination, and exclusion. They could lead to sub-optimal outcomes and could 
complicate and even undermine progress toward a more open, rules-based, and non-
discriminatory multilateral trading system. More worrying than discrimination perhaps is the 
additional inherent complexity that is created by overlapping and conflicting regulatory regimes 
promoted by myriads of PTAs. This concern is already clearly identified and the call for 
multilateralizing regionalism already voiced in the WTO (Baldwin and Low 2009). The concern 
that PTAs “compete” with multilateral negotiations for the attention of negotiators and that they 
provide an untidy way of proceeding to liberalization remains legitimate. 
Yet, one chief emerging lesson is that the economic paradigm of shallow PTAs does not 
necessarily apply to deep and comprehensive PTAs. “Old” concepts such as mercantilist 
reciprocal liberalization, trade creation and diversion, or a textual approach to signing PTAs may 
still underpin the reasoning of many policy makers but are often obsolete or incomplete for deep 
integration liberalization. Failure to understand the new paradigm of preferential integration may 
in turn explain why most PTAs have either not exploited to the full the liberalization 
opportunities of behind the border measures or not prioritized the one closest to the parties’ 
interests – although it might be naïve to put solely the lack of progress to a lack of 
understanding.  
Second, deep integration PTAs are potentially powerful “tools” to push wide-ranging 
government-owned reforms. Beyond market access, deep integration PTAs create opportunities 
to complement trade liberalization with other behind the border reforms. And they offer unique 
instruments to promote bilateral or plurilateral cooperation and resource transfers, transparency 
mechanisms, mutual equivalence, informal mechanisms for dispute resolution, in-depth and 
expert dialogue, and deeper liberalization among the willing ones. These are not approaches that 
can be easily – or at all – replicated in the large and formal setting of multilateral institutions.  38 
 
Yet PTAs are worthwhile only if governments are themselves committed to reform and 
liberalization. PTA offer a variety of mechanisms by which the process of reform will become 
more effectively and irremediably set in motion, but a prerequisite is that meaningful 
commitments be agreed to in the first place. Deep integration PTAs should therefore strive to 
provide open access to any regulatory rules and discipline to ensure equality of treatment of all 
members and non-members so as to minimize the occurrence of “regulatory preferences”. This 
means beyond national treatment, liberal rules of origin, transparency, and the availability of due 
process. Good regulatory practice should lead to de jure preferential liberalization to becoming 
MFN liberalization in effect. The question of discrimination is likely to remain tortuous, even if 
it appears less visible than for tariffs. Discriminatory regulations could take many forms, be it 
codified or not in rules (e.g. de facto preferences can arise from rules that look non-preferential 
on paper, or from preferential enforcement). Furthermore, discrimination may also paradoxically 
be the only form of acceptable liberalization, such as with mutual recognition.  
Third, deep integration should be pursued in a strategic and selective manner. Another answer 
to complexity, not sufficiently considered by developing countries in our view, is selectivity (this 
is also something suggested by Hoekman and Sekkat, 2010). Liberalization is a complex matter, 
not only from a capacity standpoint, but also politically. The political economy of deep 
integration involves many (often opposing) interests and a large set of potential stakeholders. 
Overloading the negotiating agenda (which will later on become the implementing agenda) keeps 
the focus away from what may be achievable and where gains may be the most important. 
Agreements bloated by too many issues may lose significance and fail to achieve much. 
On the other hand, picking meaningful issues with the right partner and adequate technical 
assistance and cooperative approach may result in substantial liberalization progress and serve as 
a positive signal or trigger for more challenging areas. Market access should not be the only item 
on the agenda of negotiators, especially those of developing countries, since deep integration is 
really about thinking of a domestic reform strategy. In this respect too, prioritization of core 
objectives and sequencing should be central consideration of negotiators. And sound regulatory 
practice should underpin liberalization to minimize the occurrence of “regulatory preferences” 
and ensure the overall consistency of liberalization and regulatory objectives.  39 
 
And fourth, there is no one-size-fits-all deep integration. As policy makers start integrating 
more and more these new dimensions, we can expect that they will become more intensive 
“users” of PTAs to further liberalization objectives, hopefully in complement to multilateral 
efforts. Liberalization in each sector is not a simple matter and escapes easy characterization, as 
well as one-size-fits-all types of answers. This complexity means that there are few universal 
rules to follow, mainly carefully designed and specific solutions. Deep integration is essentially a 
sui generis process as for instance illustrated by Winters (2010) in the case of the EU. Yet, 
complexity means that some core principles should be followed to promote to the extent possible 
market-based solutions. 
The dynamics of North-South, South-South and North-North PTAs differ considerably. 
Asymmetric agreements make cooperation less easy and may provide less scope for transnational 
public goods, mutual recognition, but more prospects of lock-in, and access to imported 
regulatory regimes when needed. Market access considerations will be overbearing for the small 
partner, whereas the larger partner will seek beyond that to diffuse its regulatory norms, 
including values norms, and trigger competitive liberalization effects in partner countries. A 
related logic can be observed with the European Union, which attempts to leverage its PTAs to 
shape South-South agreements in recent wave of agreements with the Mediterranean countries, 
the Balkans and the ACP countries (Maur, 2005). 
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